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using key insights distilled from the theoretical literature. Thus, this paper aims to bridge the 
gap between the theory and practice of monetary policy transparency. 
JEL Code: E58, D82. 







Faculty of Economics 
University of Cambridge 






Part of this paper was written while the author was visiting the Center for Economic Studies 
(CES) in Munich, which I thank for its hospitality. 1 Introduction
Transparency has become one of the main features of monetary policymaking during the last
decade. The advance of transparency has been accompanied by a burgeoning theoretical liter-
ature. However, there is still a large gap between the theory and practice of monetary policy
transparency. This paper formulates stylized facts on the transparency of central banks. Fur-
thermore, it provides a systematic overview of transparency practices around the world, which
shows how the extent of information disclosure by central banks depends on the monetary policy
framework and on the particular aspect of the monetary policymaking process that is involved.
The empirical ﬁndings are explained using key insights distilled from the large variety of theo-
retical results in the literature. Thus, the paper reconciles the theory and practice of monetary
policy transparency.
In theory, transparency refers to a situation of symmetric information. Reductions in infor-
mation asymmetries between monetary policymakers and the private sector improve the trans-
parency of monetary policy. The consequences of greater transparency depend on the speciﬁc
context and are not necessarily positive. But in general there are two kinds of effects, namely
ex post ‘information effects’ that are directly based on the disclosed information, and ex ante
‘incentive effects’ that structurally alter economic behavior based on the new information struc-
ture. These effects, which are in the spirit of Geraats (2002), are further explained in section 2
and are used throughout the paper to explain the empirical ﬁndings.
The main contribution of this paper is to present three stylized facts on the practice of mone-
tary policy transparency. In particular, in section 3 it is established that (I) central banks consider
transparency very important for monetary policy, (II) transparency of monetary policy has in-
creased remarkably during the last 15 years, and (III) monetary policy transparency displays
substantial heterogeneity both across and within monetary policy frameworks.
This third empirical ﬁnding is a major theme of this paper that is further developed in the
systematic overview of the practice of monetary policy transparency throughout the world in
section 4. This overview presents more detailed empirical facts covering the four main com-
ponents of the monetary policymaking process, namely the institutions and formal objectives
that shape monetary policy preferences (section 4.1), the economic conditions that determine
the constraints faced by policymakers (section 4.2), the monetary policy strategy and decision
process that form some kind of decision rule (section 4.3), and the monetary policy stance that
is the outcome of the decision-making process (section 4.4).
The facts on transparency practices highlight that there are some aspects of the policymak-
ing process for which there is a fair amount of transparency in a large majority of countries,
including central bank independence, monetary policy targets, forward-looking analysis and ex-
planations of policy changes. However, there are also several issues about which central banks
are largely opaque, including minutes, voting records and explanations of policy decisions not
to adjust policy settings.
Inadditiontothesedifferencesintransparencyacrossmonetarypolicyaspects, thereisalsoa
lot of variety across monetary policy frameworks. In particular, exchange rate targeters are often
1considerably less transparent than others, whereas inﬂation targeters tend to be signiﬁcantly
moretransparent. Althoughtheadoptionofinﬂationtargetingbymanycountrieshascontributed
to the rise in central bank transparency, this paper makes clear that inﬂation targeting is neither
a necessary nor a sufﬁcient condition for transparency. In fact, there is remarkable variation in
transparency practices among inﬂation targeters.
The paper discusses two other issues relevant for transparency practices. It argues that trans-
parency is not solely driven by accountability requirements (section 5.1). In addition, it ad-
dresses communication challenges (section 5.2). The conclusions of the paper are summarized
in section 6.
There is a rapidly expanding literature on transparency of monetary policy. A systematic sur-
vey of this literature is provided by Geraats (2002). In addition, there is an increasing amount
of empirical research that estimates the economic effects of monetary policy transparency. The
results so far largely suggest that greater transparency tends to be beneﬁcial for monetary policy.
In particular, there is econometric evidence that monetary policy transparency reduces aver-
age inﬂation (Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne 2002), lowers the sacriﬁce ratio (Chortareas,
Stasavage and Sterne 2003), and improves the predictability of monetary policy actions (e.g.
Gerlach-Kristen 2004). The present paper contributes to the transparency literature by system-
atically exploring the practice of central bank transparency and reconciling it with theoretical
insights.
2 Theoretical Insights
Transparency of monetary policy refers to the absence of information asymmetries between
monetary policymakers and the private sector (e.g. Geraats 2002). Perfect transparency corre-
sponds to a situation of symmetric information. This does not imply that monetary policymakers
and the private sector have complete information. For instance, they could both be uncertain
about economic disturbances. But perfect transparency means that both face the same informa-
tion and uncertainties.
It is easy to see that greater transparency could be beneﬁcial since the private sector gets
access to more information. In fact, in an economy with no market imperfections besides an
information asymmetry, perfect transparency is optimal by the ﬁrst welfare theorem. However,
an increase in transparency could be detrimental in richer, more realistic settings.
To better understand the consequences of transparency it is fruitful to distinguish two basic
effects, which I label here as ‘information effects’ and ‘incentive effects’.1 Information effects
are the direct, ex post effects of the information disclosure. In particular, when the central bank
(the sender) reveals information to the private sector (the receiver), the central bank no longer
has the opportunity to use its information advantage and the private sector gets access to new
information to act upon. Incentive effects are the indirect, ex ante structural changes in economic
behavior that result from the different information structure under greater transparency. In par-
ticular, anticipating the disclosure of a particular type of information, the central bank and/or
1They are similar to the effects described by Geraats (2002), except for being more general and sophisticated.
2private sector could face incentives to structurally alter their behavior. It should be stressed that
the information and incentive effects of an increase in transparency need not be beneﬁcial but
could actually be detrimental.
Regarding information effects, the receiver of the information always enjoys a direct beneﬁt
because (s)he faces less uncertainty and has the opportunity to make better informed decisions.
The new information also leads to an adjustment of the receiver’s expectations, which could
affect other economic variables, possibly in undesirable ways. In addition, the communications
of the sender may be misunderstood by the receiver, which gives rise to unintended noise.
To give some examples of information effects, transparency about the central bank’s prefer-
ences makes monetary policy more predictable for the private sector. But the communication of
central bank targets could affect inﬂation expectations and make inﬂation more volatile, which
is exacerbated by misinterpretations (Geraats 2005a). The disclosure of supply shocks could
have a similar negative information effect.
In addition, a central bank with an exchange rate peg would be ill-advised to announce that
its foreign reserves are running low since it is bound to incite a speculative attack. Similarly, a
central bank would be prudent to keep liquidity problems of commercial banks conﬁdential to
prevent bank runs. Such ‘ex post discretionary disclosures’ give rise to detrimental information
effects that could imperil ﬁnancial stability (Gai and Shin 2003). However, ‘ex ante communi-
cation’ of such information in the form of regularly scheduled data releases on foreign reserves
and liquidity positions could encourage prudent behavior that reduces the likelihood of ﬁnancial
fragility, which is a beneﬁcial incentive effect.
The incentive effects of transparency could affect the economic behavior of both the sender
and receiver of information. In particular, in response to the new information structure the
receiver could modify the formation of its expectations. In turn, the change in responsiveness
of the receiver’s expectations could affect the sender’s behavior. Suppose that the private sector
cannot observe the central bank’s preferences but attempts to infer them from monetary policy
actions and outcomes. When there is greater transparency about the economic shocks affecting
policy actions and outcomes, private sector expectations optimally become more sensitive to
unanticipated changes in policy actions and outcomes as they provide a more accurate signal of
the central bank’s preferences. The stronger response of inﬂation expectations makes the pursuit
of inﬂationary preferences more costly, so that the central bank has a greater incentive to keep
inﬂation in check. Stated differently, transparency induces the central bank to build and maintain
a reputation for low inﬂation (e.g. Faust and Svensson 2001, Geraats 2005b).
However, the response of the receiver could also have detrimental incentive effects. Sup-
pose that economic agents with private signals have a motive to coordinate their actions (such
as in ﬁnancial markets) and therefore put a disproportionately high weight on a public signal
sent by the central bank. Then, greater central bank transparency increases the reliance on the
public signal even further, which could lead to greater volatility when the public signal is sufﬁ-
ciently noisy (Morris and Shin 2002). The increased focus on public communications due to a
coordination motive also reduces the informativeness of market signals (Shin and Morris 2005).
In addition, public disclosure could crowd out private sector efforts to acquire their own infor-
3mation and thereby reduce the net improvement in forecast accuracy (Tong 2005). Similar in
spirit, less secrecy makes it less costly for ﬁnancial market participants to engage in central bank
watching, which could increase volatility due to overreactions (Rudin 1988).
Finally, public disclosure could have another incentive effect by increasing the sender’s ef-
forts to improve the quality of its information so that it can withstand public scrutiny. For
instance, the publication of central bank forecasts could induce the central bank to produce
ﬁrst rate macroeconomic projections. Similarly, the release of the minutes of monetary policy
meetings could stimulate central bankers to engage in a high quality policy discussion. Thus,
transparency could lead to better decision making.
These theoretical arguments give rise to three key results of the effects of monetary policy
transparency on predictability, reputation and credibility.
(A) Transparency improves the predictability of monetary policy actions and outcomes.
This follows directly from the information effect that transparency reduces private sector un-
certainty about the monetary policymaking process. A better understanding of the monetary
policy objectives, strategy and decision-making process, combined with information about eco-
nomic disturbances helps the private sector to better forecast the settings of the policy instrument
and the effects on inﬂation and aggregate output. Empirically, greater monetary policy trans-
parency indeed appears to lead to better predictability of monetary policy actions (e.g. Gerlach-
Kristen 2004, Swanson 2004).
Although in theory, greater transparency improves predictability (ceteris paribus), it could
be misleading to use private sector forecast errors or market reactions to monetary policy de-
cisions as a measure of lack of central bank transparency. The reason is that predictability is
also determined by economic disturbances. When there are no major shocks to the economy,
monetary policy is likely to be more predictable even in the absence of improved central bank
communication. So, better predictability need not be the consequence of greater transparency.
(B) Transparency induces reputation building as it increases the sensitivity of private sector
expectations to unanticipated policy actions and outcomes.
This incentive effect follows from the fact that transparency makes monetary policy actions and
outcomesabettersignalofthecentralbank’sintentions.2 Thegreatersensitivityofprivatesector
expectations makes it less costly for a high-inﬂation central bank to build reputation through
contractionary policies. In addition, a central bank that attempts to boost output beyond its
naturalratewouldquicklybeexposedandbepenalizedthroughhigherinﬂationexpectations. As
a result, transparency makes central banks more inclined to pursue low inﬂation and lowers the
sacriﬁce ratio associated with disinﬂations. There is indeed econometric evidence that supports
this (Chortareas et al.2002, 2003).
(C) Transparency enhances credibility and makes long-run private sector inﬂation expectations
more stable.
2To be precise, this relies on the plausible assumption that there is some uncertainty about monetary policy prefer-
ences, which inherently cannot be directly observed. So, the effect does not apply to perfect preference transparency.
4Transparency allows the private sector to check whether monetary policy actions and outcomes
are consistent with formal monetary policy objectives, which increases the credibility of mon-
etary policy. Besides this information effect, there is an incentive effect as the private sector
becomes more assured of the central bank’s good intentions, which reduces its sensitivity to
policy actions and outcomes. As a consequence, transparency helps to anchor long-run inﬂa-
tion expectations.3 Empirical evidence indicates that greater transparency indeed makes pri-
vate sector inﬂation expectations less sensitive to past inﬂation outcomes (van der Cruijsen and
Demertzis 2005).
This outlines the main theoretical effects of transparency. A more detailed and comprehen-
sive survey of the theory of central bank transparency is provided by Geraats (2002).
3 Stylized Facts
The practice of monetary policy transparency is very diverse and still evolving over time. Nev-
ertheless, three empirical facts can be identiﬁed:
I Central banks consider transparency very important for monetary policy.
II Transparency of monetary policy has increased remarkably during the last 15 years.
III Monetary policy transparency displays substantial heterogeneity both across and within
monetary policy frameworks.
It is useful to formally substantiate each of these stylized facts.
I Central banks consider transparency very important for monetary policy.
In a wide-ranging survey of 94 central banks in 1998 by Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger and
Sterne (2000), 74% of central banks consider transparency a ‘vital’ or ‘very important’ com-
ponent of their monetary policy framework. The only two factors that were rated higher were
independence of the central bank and the maintenance of low inﬂation expectations, which were
considered vital or very important by 83% and 82%, respectively (Fry et al. 2000, Table 8.1).
However, the importance attached to transparency is not shared equally among central banks.
Although transparency ranked third for industrialized countries (just as for the entire sample),
transitional and especially developing countries rated transparency lower. In particular, 50% of
central banks from industrialized countries considered transparency vital, but only 29% from
transitional and developing countries.
It is often argued that there are two key reasons for transparency: democratic accountability
and economic beneﬁts (e.g. Blinder, Goodhart, Hildebrand, Lipton and Wyplosz 2001). First,
transparency is necessary for accountability, which is used to ensure the democratic legitimacy
3This is based on the plausible assumption that long-run monetary policy objectives are stable. Otherwise, inﬂa-
tion expectations could become more volatile as they track the objectives more closely under transparency.
5of monetary policy. This is especially relevant for central banks that enjoy operational indepen-
dence. This may explain the marked difference in the importance of transparency for central
bankers. According to the survey by Fry et al. (2000, Table 4.4), 57% of central banks from in-
dustrialized countries report that they can formulate and implement policy independently with-
out any government constraint, whereas this applies to only 30% from transitional and develop-
ing countries. In addition, there is a strong, highly signiﬁcant correlation of +0.42 between the
measures for ‘independence’ and ‘policy explanations’ constructed by Fry et al. (2000). This
conﬁrms that there is a positive relation between central bank independence and transparency.
The other main rationale for transparency is its economic beneﬁts. As explained in section
2, transparency reduces private sector uncertainty and enhances the predictability of monetary
policy. Furthermore, it could give central banks a stronger incentive to build reputation. It could
also be good for credibility. This is clear from the survey by Blinder (2000, Table 2), in which
88 central bankers indicated that important factors to establish or maintain credibility are (i) a
history of honesty, (ii) central bank independence, (iii) a history of ﬁghting inﬂation, and (iv)
transparency, where the latter two get nearly the same average rating. This provides another
reason why the great majority of central banks consider transparency very important.
II Transparency of monetary policy has increased remarkably during the last 15 years.
The most prominent way in which the increase in transparency of monetary policy has materi-
alized is through the adoption of ‘inﬂation targeting’ by an increasing number of central banks.
Inﬂation targeting could be deﬁned as a monetary policy framework that involves an institutional
commitment to price stability that focuses on an explicit quantitative target for inﬂation as the
nominal anchor for monetary policy. Sometimes it is referred to as ‘direct’ or ‘explicit’ inﬂation
targeting since other monetary policy frameworks such as exchange rate or monetary targeting
generally target inﬂation implicitly and/or indirectly through an intermediate target. The insti-
tutional commitment to price stability typically consists of central bank independence together
with accountability requirements and a high degree of transparency through regular central bank
publications.
ThepioneerofinﬂationtargetingwasNewZealand, wheretheReserveBankofNewZealand
Act of 1989 and the Policy Targets Agreement of March 1990 provided the institutional foun-
dations of its new monetary policy framework. Other early adopters of inﬂation targeting were
Canada (in 1991), the United Kingdom (in 1992), Sweden (in 1993), Finland (from 1993 un-
til 1998), Australia (in 1994) and Spain (from 1994 until 1998).4 In addition, a few emerging
countries in the process of disinﬂation introduced annual inﬂation targets without immediately
adopting full-ﬂedged inﬂation targeting, namely Chile (in 1991), Israel (in 1992) and Peru (in
1994).
Inﬂation targeting became more widespread in the late 1990s as it proved popular with
emerging countries that were looking for a new monetary policy framework after abandoning
ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. The number of inﬂation targeters has steadily grown over time to
more than 20 and now also includes Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Mex-
4Finland and Spain had to abandon inﬂation targeting to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1998.
6ico, Norway, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland and Thailand.5 This
advance of inﬂation targeting has contributed considerably to greater transparency of monetary
policy.
However, the increase in transparency has not been conﬁned to the adoption of inﬂation
targeting. More generally, the use of explicit targets and monitoring ranges for inﬂation, money
or the exchange rate has quickly expanded from only 43 (out of 84 surveyed) countries in 1990
to 89 (out of 93) in 1998 (Fry et al. 2000, Table 3.1), which corresponds to an increase in the
relative frequency from 51.2% to 95.7%. Furthermore, transparency has also improved in other
respects as is evident from the central bank transparency index by Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2004),
which provides a measure of the disclosure of information pertinent to monetary policymaking.
The index is available for nine major central banks from 1998 to 2002 and it shows a signiﬁcant
average rise in transparency. Most of this appears to be attributable to improved disclosure of
economic information such as the central bank’s macroeconomic forecasts and policy models.
The biggest increases in the transparency index were for Sweden and New Zealand, which were
already experienced inﬂation targeters. But there were also notable rises in transparency for
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the US Federal Reserve. This shows that the advance of
transparency is a more general phenomenon that goes beyond the adoption of inﬂation targeting.
The fact that monetary policy transparency has increased may be related to institutional re-
forms in many countries that have enhanced central bank independence and reinforced account-
ability. But the openness displayed by most central banks by far exceeds formal accountability
requirements. This suggests that central banks have adopted greater transparency primarily be-
cause of perceived economic beneﬁts.
IIIMonetarypolicytransparencydisplayssubstantialheterogeneitybothacrossandwithinmon-
etary policy frameworks.
There are large variations in the degree of transparency. In particular, it depends on the kind of
information involved and differs signiﬁcantly across monetary policy frameworks, but there is
also much variation in transparency for central banks that share the same monetary policy frame-
work. These facts are clear from Table 1, which reports the relative frequency of transparency
about several issues across the 94 central banks surveyed by Fry et al. (2000).6 The ﬁrst column
shows that it is very common to publish a speciﬁc target, to provide an explanation of policy
changes on the day of a change to the monetary policy instrument, and to include forecasts or
other forward-looking analysis in regular central bank reports and bulletins. In particular, this
occurs for 88%, 81% and 78% of surveyed central banks, respectively. In addition, 67% of
central banks enjoy instrument independence in the sense that the central bank decides on the
adjustment of monetary policy instruments, without any government representative attending
5Although the Swiss central bank has stated not to be an inﬂation targeter, it is often included (e.g. Schmidt-
Hebbel and Tapia 2002, Fracasso, Genberg and Wyplosz 2003)and its monetary policy framework is consistent with
the deﬁnition of inﬂation targeting provided above.
6There are some missing observations in the Fry et al. (2000)data appendix, some of which could be recovered
from additional information in their study. An attempt to ﬁll in the remaining missing information for Denmark, the
EMU and Singapore gives results very similar to those in Tables 1, 3 and 4.
7Table 1: Monetary policy transparency across and within monetary policy frameworks.
Relative frequency Full sample Targeting Other Homogeneity
Exch. rate Money Inﬂation rejecteda
Publication of
Target 0.883 0.962 0.913 0.933 0.767 **
Forecastsb 0.780 0.667 0.870 0.933 0.724 *
Minutesb 0.176 0.083 0.087 0.600 0.103 ***
Voting records 0.064 0.000 0.043 0.200 0.067 **
Policy change explanations 0.809 0.808 0.696 0.933 0.833 **
Instrument independence 0.670 0.692 0.696 0.733 0.600 -
Observations 94 (91b) 26 (24b) 23 15 30 (29b)
Source: Author’s calculations using Fry et al. (2000) survey data.
Note: Numbers in bold differ more than 10 percent point from the relative frequency in the full sample.
a) Â2
1 test of homogeneity between monetary policy frameworks rejected at a signiﬁcance level of (*)
10%, (**) 5% or (***) 1%.
b) Missing observations for Denmark, EMU and Singapore.
the monetary policy meeting other than as an observer. However, the minutes or a summary
discussion of monetary policy meetings are published by only 18% of central banks, and voting
records or patterns are released by a meager 6%.7 These results show that central banks are not
transparent in all respects. This also follows from the detailed transparency data collected by
Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2004), which covers ﬁfteen different items for nine major central banks.
The other four columns in Table 1 show that the heterogeneity in relative frequencies persists
when focusing on central banks with the same monetary policy framework. The classiﬁcation
is based on the Fry et al. (2000) survey conducted in 1998, which asked each central bank to
categorize its monetary policy framework as ‘exchange rate targeting’, ‘money targeting’, ‘in-
ﬂation targeting’, or another framework. Each monetary policy regime appears to have its own
transparency characteristics. In particular, exchange rate targeters generally publish the target
but not minutes and voting records. Monetary targeters typically do not release minutes and vot-
ing records either, but they tend to disclose forecasts in addition to the target. Inﬂation targeters
are generally transparent about the target and forecasts, as well as policy change explanations.
The other central banks have in common that they do not tend to provide minutes and voting
records. In all other respects, there is quite some variation in transparency among the central
banks within each framework.
Interestingly, this heterogeneity in disclosure practices extends to inﬂation targeters. This
is conﬁrmed by the Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2004)data, which makes clear that clarity about the
objective of price stability with a numeric target for inﬂation are common features of inﬂation
targeting, but there is considerable diversity in transparency about central bank forecasts, policy
7Note that minutes and voting records do not exist when monetary policy decisions are made solely by the central
bank governor, which is further discussed in section 4.3.
8decision explanations, policy inclinations, minutes, voting records, unanticipated transmission
disturbances and policy evaluations. This shows that inﬂation targeting by no means implies
transparency about all aspects of the monetary policymaking process.
The rows in Table 1 show for each transparency item the differences across monetary policy
frameworks, where relative frequencies that differ more than 10 percent point from the full
sample are highlighted in bold. Furthermore, the last column in Table 1 reports for each item
whether there is a statistically signiﬁcant difference in the relative frequency between monetary
policy regimes using a homogeneity test.8 This gives rise to several ﬁndings.
First of all, the relative frequency of a published target is signiﬁcantly less for central banks
that do not engage in one of the three targeting frameworks. In other words, central banks with
a targeting framework are more likely to have an explicit target, which is not surprising.
More interesting is the fact that transparency about forecasts is considerably less frequent
for exchange rate targeters but prevalent among inﬂation targeters. The difference between the
two is statistically signiﬁcant. Homogeneity is even more ﬁrmly rejected when money targeters
are combined with inﬂation targeters and exchange rate targeters with others.9 This difference
reﬂects the greater need for forward-looking analysis in monetary and especially inﬂation tar-
geting.
Another striking result is that inﬂation targeters are much more likely to publish minutes
and voting records. Perhaps, openness about the decision process is more important because
inﬂation targeting is more involved, whereas exchange rate and monetary targets can be more
directly controlled.
Finally, although a great majority of central banks provides a prompt explanation for policy
changes, it is less common under monetary targeting but nearly universal under inﬂation target-
ing. The difference between the latter two is statistically signiﬁcant, but it appears to be driven
by opaque monetary targeters in developing countries.
The overview in Table 1 clearly establishes that there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in trans-
parency across monetary policy frameworks. In particular, inﬂation targeters are most likely
to be transparent, whereas opacity is more common among exchange rate targeters and central
banks without a targeting framework. The diversity in information disclosure is also evident
from the next section, which takes a more detailed and systematic look at the practice of central
bank transparency.
4 Transparency in Practice
To further analyze transparency practices it is useful to distinguish the key components of the
monetary policymaking process. In practice, monetary policymaking is a very elaborate process,
8More precisely, a Â
2
1 test of homogeneity is used to test for each transparency item whether the relative fre-
quency in bold equals the aggregate relative frequency of the other three frameworks, or in case of two bold relative
frequencies, whether they are equal to each other.
9The p-value of the Â
2
1 test of homogeneity between money and inﬂation targeters versus exchange rate targeters
and others equals 0.025.
9but conceptually it can be described by policymakers’ preferences, economic constraints and a
decision rule, which result in a policy decision. The preferences of monetary policymakers are
shaped by institutional arrangements and formal objectives. The economic conditions faced by
policymakers are determined by the structure of the economy and economic disturbances. The
decision rule is given by the monetary policy strategy, which explains abstractly how preferences
and economic information are combined to formulate a monetary policy decision. This decision
making process results in the monetary policy stance. Each of these components is critical
to understanding the monetary policymaking process. The remainder of this section discusses
transparency practices for each component, namely institutions and objectives in section 4.1,
economic conditions in section 4.2, strategy and decision-making in section 4.3, and the policy
stance in section 4.4.10
Detailed information on the transparency practices of central banks can be obtained from
several sources. There is extensive documentation for inﬂation targeters, including Bernanke,
Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999), Schaechter, Stone and Zelmer (2000), Schmidt-Hebbel and
Tapia (2002)and Fracasso, Genberg and Wyplosz (2003). There are only a few elaborate stud-
ies on the practice of monetary policy transparency that are not conﬁned to inﬂation targeting,
namely Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger and Sterne (2000), Blinder, Goodhart, Hildebrand, Lipton
and Wyplosz (2001)and Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2004). In addition, central bank web sites are
an invaluable source of up-to-date information.
4.1 Institutions and Objectives
The policy preferences that drive monetary policy decisions are determined by who the policy-
makers are and what institutional arrangements and policy objectives they face. When monetary
policy is run by the government it is prone to the whims of politicians with electoral concerns.
Such ﬁckle, political interests lead to uncertainty about monetary policy objectives. This can
be avoided by delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank with formal mone-
tary policy objectives. Thus, central bank independence enhances transparency since it isolates
monetary policymakers from political pressures.
In practice, central bank independence is very common. In the survey by Fry et al. (2000,
Table 4.4), 71% of central banks report that they enjoy independence without signiﬁcant quali-
ﬁcations. However, in developing countries this holds for only 57% of central banks.11
Central bank independence appears to be determined by several institutional characteristics.
The degree of independence reported by central banks in the survey by Fry et al. (2000, Ta-
ble 6.1)is strongly positively correlated with limits on monetary ﬁnancing of the government
budget deﬁcit and the degree of instrument independence. It also shows a signiﬁcant, positive
10This structure is similar to Geraats (2002), who distinguishes the ‘political’, ‘economic’, ‘procedural’, ‘policy’
and ‘operational’ aspects of the policymaking process. Although that distinction makes it easier to understand all the
subtleties of the theoretical transparency literature, the present framework is more useful for the practice of monetary
policy transparency.
11Data on this issue is not available for individual central banks, which precludes a comparison across monetary
policy regimes.
10Table 2: Central bank independence and its key determinants.
Relative frequency Full sample Developing
countries
Independence without signiﬁcant qualiﬁcations 71% 57%
Effective limits on monetary ﬁnancing of ﬁscal deﬁcits 65% 41%
Instrument independence 67% 50%
Long term of central bank governor (¸ 5 years) 79% 70%
Observations 94 44
Source: Fry et al. (2000, Table 4.4)and author’s calculations.
correlation with the length of the term of ofﬁce of the central bank governor.
Table 2 shows the frequency of central bank independence and its key institutional char-
acteristics for the full sample of 94 countries and the 44 developing countries in the Fry et al.
(2000)survey. Effective limits on monetary ﬁnancing of ﬁscal deﬁcits, in the form of well-
enforced prohibitions or narrow limits, are in place for 65% of the full sample, but only 41% of
developing countries. Such ﬁnancing limits are important to prevent hyperinﬂation caused by
the reliance on seignorage to extract government revenue. In 67% of the full sample but only
50% of developing countries, the central bank has instrument independence in the sense that it
can determine the adjustment of monetary policy instruments without government interference.
A long term of ofﬁce of the central bank governor of at least ﬁve years is present in a large
majority, namely 79% of countries, including 70% of developing countries. A term of ofﬁce
that exceeds the length of the electoral cycle is useful to reduce political inﬂuence through the
(re)appointment of central bankers.
It is clear from Table 2 that in most countries, but to a lesser extent in developing countries,
the central bank enjoys independence. The most popular theoretical motivation for central bank
independence is based on the time-inconsistency problem in rational expectations models in
which monetary policymakers attempt to stimulate output beyond its natural rate (Kydland and
Prescott 1977). The resulting inﬂation bias can be reduced by delegating monetary policy to
a ‘conservative’ central banker that puts greater weight on inﬂation stabilization, but it comes
at the cost of greater output variability (Rogoff 1985). In practice, the inﬂation bias appears to
be eliminated by the delegation of monetary policy to ‘responsible’ central bankers that aim to
stabilize output around its natural rate (Blinder 1997).
Central bank independence facilitates monetary policy transparency because it allows the
central bank to pursue the monetary policy objectives without undue political pressures. Gen-
erally, monetary policy objectives focus (directly or indirectly) on price stability. The use of
explicit targets for monetary policy is prevalent nowadays. Only 5 (out of 93) central banks in
the survey by Fry et al. (2000) report that they do not have an explicit exchange rate, money or
inﬂation target. However, exchange rate and money targets tend to be operational or interme-
11diate targets and do not convey the central bank’s ultimate objectives. In that respect, inﬂation
targets are more informative and they are published by 55 (out of 93) countries (Fry et al. 2000,
Table A.4). However, in 36 countries the inﬂation target is set for a period of only one year or
revised more than annually. Considering the substantial lag with which monetary policy actions
affect inﬂation, these short term inﬂation targets are more similar to inﬂation projections rather
than an indication of policy preferences. Only 18 (out of 93) countries have a long run inﬂa-
tion target (Fry et al. 2000, Chart 3.6), which shows that transparency is not so common in this
respect.
There is some variation in the design of inﬂation targets as shown by Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2002, Table 2), who focus on inﬂation targeters. The inﬂation target could be deter-
mined by the government, the central bank or jointly. The measure of inﬂation tends to be the
one-year change in the consumer price index or some core measure that excludes certain factors
such as indirect taxes and interest charges. The target is often in the form of a range (of about
two percentage points) or a point with some tolerance range. In addition, a few countries have
escape clauses that specify when deviations from the target are permitted. The target horizon
is typically indeﬁnite for advanced countries, but emerging countries on a path of disinﬂation
generally use a one-year horizon to maintain ﬂexibility.
The inﬂation target is by no means a complete description of the central bank’s objectives.
Other variables are likely to matter as well, such as output or ﬁnancial stability. Complete
transparency about monetary policymakers’ preferences would require knowledge about all the
variables in their implicit ‘loss function’, the target for each variable, the functional form of the
loss function, and the relative weight attached to each variable.
In practice, central banks are extremely opaque about these other features of the monetary
policy loss function, with two exceptions. First, central banks with a point target for inﬂation
often have an explicit tolerance margin around the target, which is typically plus/minus one
percent point. This suggests a symmetric concern about deviations of inﬂation from the target.
Second, in many countries price stability is not the sole objective or concern of monetary
policy. Some central banks formally have multiple goals. For instance, the US Federal Reserve
Act (section 2A) stipulates the goals of “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate
long-term interest rates”. In addition, most inﬂation targeters that have the primary goal of
price stability acknowledge that they also care about stability of the real economy and/or the
ﬁnancial sector. So, inﬂation targeters are by no means ‘inﬂation nutters’ that single-mindedly
practice ‘strict inﬂation targeting’ with the sole objective of inﬂation stabilization, but instead
they engage in ‘ﬂexible inﬂation targeting’. However, inﬂation targeters are not precise about
the weight they attach to inﬂation stabilization versus output stabilization, although empirical
evidence suggests that the adoption of inﬂation targeting tends to increase the relative weight
that the central bank places on inﬂation stabilization (Cecchetti and Ehrmann 2002).
Although transparency about the monetary policy loss function would lead to a beneﬁcial
information effect as it reduces private sector uncertainty, the theoretical literature provides a
number of reasons why opacity may be desirable.
Regarding policy targets, the communication of the output target could affect inﬂation ex-
12pectations. This makes it more difﬁcult to reach the output target and the greater variability
of inﬂation expectations hampers the stabilization of inﬂation (Geraats 2005a). In addition, it
is better to be silent about an output target that exceeds the natural rate of output, because it
would lead to an inﬂation bias, as mentioned above. Furthermore, when the level of the target
is highly uncertain (e.g. the natural rate of output, or fundamental asset prices) and the central
bank is unlikely to have superior information about it compared to the private sector, disclosure
of the target could cause ﬁnancial market participants to ignore their private information and
coordinate on the noisy disclosed target, leading to greater volatility (cf Morris and Shin 2002).
With respect to the functional form, monetary policymakers beneﬁt from not admitting to
an asymmetric output objective that puts greater weight on output losses, because it leads to a
bias in average inﬂation. One reason is that the output preference asymmetry makes the optimal
inﬂation response to output supply shocks convex (Geraats 1999). Another reason is that it
induces ‘precautionary’ output expansions when the central bank faces uncertainty about supply
shocks (Cukierman 2002). So, transparency about the preference asymmetry causes the private
sector to rationally increase its inﬂation expectations, which exacerbates the inﬂation bias.
Concerning the policy weights, uncertainty about the weight the central bank places on
inﬂation stabilization versus output stabilization could be beneﬁcial as it induces a risk averse
union to moderate its wage demands, thereby reducing inﬂation and boosting output (Sørensen
1991).
Finally, some uncertainty about the central bank’s preferences gives the central bank a ben-
eﬁcial incentive to invest in reputation. Direct observability of the central bank’s goals could
be highly damaging because it makes the public less sensitive to monetary policy actions and
outcomes, which makes it more tempting for the central bank to pursue expansionary policy that
leads to an inﬂation bias (Faust and Svensson 2001, Geraats 2005b).
Besides these theoretical arguments, there are some practical issues associated with trans-
parency about the monetary policy loss function. First, monetary policy decisions are often
made by a committee, which raises the question how to aggregate the loss functions of individ-
ual committee members into a committee loss function. Svensson (2003)proposes to agree on
some reasonable choices, namely a loss function that is quadratic in the deviation of inﬂation
from its target and in the output gap. The weight in the loss function could be set equal to the
weight of the median committee member.
Another issue is whether the weight on inﬂation versus output stabilization is independent
of other economic variables. For instance, the central bank may be more concerned about output
volatility when unemployment is high or the ﬁnancial sector fragile. In that case, the marginal
rate of substitution between inﬂation and output depends on those other factors as well, so the
weight is not constant.
This last complication could be overcome by communicating the relative weight on inﬂation
versus output stabilization in a different fashion. The relative weight matters most when inﬂation
deviates signiﬁcantly from its target, since the preference weight determines the speed at which
inﬂation optimally returns to the target (Svensson 1997). So, the central bank could indicate the
projected time path for inﬂation whenever a substantial deviation from target arises (e.g. after
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required to do so as part of formal procedures when the target is missed. This approach is more
practical than attempting to agree on and communicate the preference weight more generally.
Tosummarize, acloserlookrevealsthattransparencyofmonetarypolicypreferencesisquite
limited in practice. Although central bank independence is very common and explicit nominal
targets are ubiquitous, relatively few countries publish a long term, numeric target for inﬂation
and there is much opacity about possible real targets, asymmetric objectives and policy weights.
4.2 Economic Conditions
The economic constraints that monetary policymakers face are determined by the structure of
the economy and economic disturbances. So, economic information is a vital input in the poli-
cymaking process. Transparency requires the disclosure of all economic information relevant to
monetary policy, including economic statistics, central bank forecasts and policy models.
Monetary policymakers generally examine a large amount of economic data before they
make a policy decision. The economic statistics they consider are largely publicly available.
One exception is conﬁdential bank supervisory information, which has been shown to affect
monetary policy decisions (Peek, Rosengren and Tootell 1999). However, the most important
source of asymmetric information between the central bank and the private sector stems from the
interpretation of the economic data. In particular, the central bank could have different economic
models and forecasts than the private sector. It is plausible that a central bank, which typically
employs a large number of PhD economists, uses a more sophisticated economic model and has
more detailed forecasts than ﬁnancial market participants, which each have much more limited
resources. In fact, Romer and Romer (2000)have shown that conﬁdential Federal Reserve staff
forecasts are superior to commercial forecasts, even at short horizons.
Macroeconomic forecasts are important because the monetary policy instrument cannot im-
mediately affect inﬂation. Typically, there is a transmission lag of one to two years, which makes
a forward-looking approach necessary for monetary policy. Table 3 shows that over 75% of cen-
tral banks publish forward-looking analysis. However, more detailed forward-looking analysis
is far less common. In particular, only 41% of central banks release forecasts that are published
more than annually. Frequent forecasts are important because macroeconomic conditions could
change signiﬁcantly in the course of a year. In addition, quantitative forecasts in the form of
numbers and/or graphs provide greater clarity but are provided by only 37% of central banks.
Although assessments of risks to forecasts give a useful indication of uncertainties, only 34% of
central bank publishes them in any (qualitative or quantitative) form. Finally, forecasts errors,
which explain why well-intended monetary policy actions may not have obtained the desired
macroeconomic outcomes, are disclosed by less than a third of central banks.
The extent to which forecasts are published appears to depend on the monetary policy frame-
work. Table 1 already established that inﬂation and monetary targeters are more likely to publish
forward-looking analysis than exchange rate targeters and others. Table 3 further conﬁrms that
inﬂation targeters clearly distinguish themselves from others in forecast transparency. In partic-
14Table 3: Forecast transparency across and within monetary policy frameworks.
Relative frequency Full sample Targeting Other Homogeneity
Exch. rate Money Inﬂation rejecteda
Publication of
Forecasts 0.780 0.667 0.870 0.933 0.724 *
Frequent forecasts 0.407 0.417 0.348 0.600 0.345 *
Quantitative forecasts 0.374 0.417 0.391 0.267 0.379 -
Risks to forecasts 0.341 0.391 0.261 0.467 0.310 -
Forecast errors 0.319 0.261 0.261 0.600 0.276 **
Observations 91 24 23 15 29
Source: Author’s calculations using Fry et al. (2000) survey data.
Note: Numbers in bold are over 10 percent point different from the full sample relative frequency.
a) Â2
1 test of homogeneity between monetary policy frameworks rejected at a signiﬁcance level of (*)
10% or (**) 5%.
ular, they are signiﬁcantly more likely to release frequent forecasts and discuss forecast errors.
The publication of risks to forecasts is also more common among inﬂation targeters, but this
result is not statistically signiﬁcant. Perhaps surprisingly, although virtually all inﬂation tar-
geters publish some kind of forecasts, the disclosure of quantitative forecasts is relatively rare.
In fact, it occurs less frequently for the inﬂation targeters in the Fry et al. (2000)survey than
for others, although this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. This lack of transparency is
probably due to the fact that the central banks that classiﬁed themselves as inﬂation targeters
had not all adopted full-ﬂedged inﬂation targeting. All in all, Table 3 shows that forecast trans-
parency is more common for inﬂation targeters, which helps them to explain their distinctively
forward-looking and information-inclusive approach to the conduct of monetary policy.
Nevertheless, inﬂation targeters differ considerably in the choice and format of the fore-
casts they report (see Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia 2002, Table 9). Although there is a lot of
variety in transparency practices, one central bank has deﬁnitely been a trendsetter in economic
transparency, namely the Bank of England. Its monetary policy framework and communication
strategy have served as a template for several countries that have adopted inﬂation targeting (e.g.
Brazil).
In practice, central banks tend to communicate economic conditions in a regular ‘inﬂation
report’ or bulletin that provides an elaborate review of macroeconomic developments and typi-
cally also discusses the macroeconomic outlook. Under monetary targeting, special attention is
given to money market conditions, whereas inﬂation targeters systematically analyze the deter-
minants of inﬂation, including aggregate demand and supply. The quality of information varies
noticeably, as is shown in the evaluation of inﬂation reports of inﬂation targeters by Fracasso
et al. (2003). Interestingly, they ﬁnd that higher quality inﬂation reports are associated with
smaller market reactions to monetary policy decisions, which suggests that they lead to better
predictability of policy actions.
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many central banks issue their inﬂation report within a week of a monetary policy decision,
for a signiﬁcant number of countries the monetary policy meeting and the publication of the
inﬂation report are independent events (Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia 2002, Tables 16-18). This
greatly reduces the usefulness of these reports to understand monetary policy actions and infer
the central bank’s intentions.
Another issue is the frequency with which inﬂation reports or bulletins are published. Most
inﬂation targeters have quarterly reports, but several central banks only publish every four
months (Chile, Norway, Peru) or every half year (Israel, Korea, South Africa). It is desirable to
publish the inﬂation report and macroeconomic forecasts in synch with the release of national
accounts data. Since the national accounts are generally released at quarterly frequency12, a
completely new set of macroeconomic data becomes available every quarter, which is likely to
affectthecentralbank’sforecasts. So, transparencyrequiresthattheinﬂationreportbepublished
at quarterly frequency as well.
In theory, inﬂation forecasts play a special role in inﬂation targeting and are sometimes even
considered an intermediate target. In fact, inﬂation targeting implies inﬂation forecast targeting
when the model of the economy is linear and the monetary policy loss function is quadratic (so
that certainty equivalence applies) (Svensson 1997). Since inﬂation forecasts are a key determi-
nant of monetary policy under inﬂation targeting, their publication is critical for transparency.
Indeed, all 21 inﬂation targeters analyzed by Fracasso et al. (2003, Table 1.2) regularly publish
inﬂation forecasts. These forecasts could be econometric projections prepared by central bank
staff, but often they also incorporate the viewpoints of the monetary policymaker(s). The hori-
zon of the forecasts tends to be two years, which approximately corresponds to the transmission
lag from the policy rate to inﬂation (Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia 2002, Table 9).
It is important for the central bank to form its own forecasts based on a structural macroe-
conomic model, because solely relying on the information contained in unconditional private
sector (inﬂation) forecasts would be problematic and is likely to lead to indeterminacy in ratio-
nal expectations models, as shown by Bernanke and Woodford (1997). In practice, many central
banks make use of measures of inﬂation expectations (Fry et al. 2000, Table 4.8), which could
be derived from ﬁnancial market information (for 45% of central banks), or based on surveys of
the private sector (for 43%) or outside forecasters (for 39%). Furthermore, 62% of central banks
use structural macroeconomic models and forecasts (Fry et al. 2000, Table 4.9). However, the
central bank’s policy models are not always published. Six out of the nine major central banks
analyzed by Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2004)disclose their formal macroeconomic model that is
used for policy analysis, including the Federal Reserve and the ECB, but not the Bank of Japan.
A few central banks (e.g. the Bank of England) even make the computer code available online.
Transparency about the central bank’s policy model helps to substantiate its macroeconomic
forecasts. It could also contribute to a better comprehension of the economy and thereby further
reduce macroeconomic uncertainty.
Generally, the central bank’s inﬂation forecasts are not sufﬁcient to understand monetary
12Chile is an exception with monthly national accounts data.
16policy. When the central bank is concerned about both inﬂation and output stabilization, output
forecasts are also an important input into the policy decision. In addition, the output gap deter-
mines ‘demand pull’ inﬂation and thereby plays a central role in the transmission of monetary
policy through aggregate demand. In practice, many inﬂation targeters also publish their output
growth forecasts, but central bank forecasts of the output gap are not so common (Mishkin 2004,
Table 1).
To correctly interpret central bank forecasts it is important to know the assumptions they are
based on, especially for the path of the policy instrument. Central banks that publish quantita-
tive forecasts often assume that the policy rate remains constant (for some period of time), so
that inﬂation and output forecasts provide an intuitive indicator of the need to adjust the policy
rate. An increasingly popular assumption (which has been used by the Bank of England since
1998) is that the policy rate follows the time-varying path of market expectations implied by
asset prices such as interest rate futures. This has the advantage that the policy rate assumption
is consistent with current asset prices and their expectations, so there is no need to incorporate
(highly uncertain) ﬁnancial market reactions to deviations in the policy rate from market expec-
tations. As a consequence, such forecasts are likely to provide a more accurate indicator for
the determination of the policy stance in relation to market expectations.13 Theoretically more
elegant is the assumption (ﬁrst adopted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand) that the policy
rate corresponds to the projected optimal path, which leads to forecasts that are ‘unconditional’
in the sense that they are based on an endogenous policy rate, although they still depend on
auxiliary assumptions for some other variables (e.g. oil prices).
In some countries (e.g. New Zealand, Norway) the central bank provides macroeconomic
projections for alternative scenarios, which also gives an indication of the uncertainties associ-
ated with the projections. Several central banks present a more general assessment of risks to
forecasts in the form of ‘fan charts’ that graphically illustrate conﬁdence bands associated with
the projection. They were ﬁrst introduced by the Bank of England and are now used by 12 (out
of 20) inﬂation targeters (Fracasso et al. 2003, Table 3.6). Openness about the risks to forecasts
is important because they indicate the uncertainties surrounding monetary policy outcomes. In
addition, in the absence of certainty equivalence, not only the level but also the risks to medium
term macroeconomic forecasts are needed to determine optimal monetary policy settings.
The central bank’s macroeconomic forecasts matter for two reasons. Medium run forecasts
provide information about the anticipated economic disturbances that the central bank responds
to, and changes to short run forecasts are informative about unanticipated transmission shocks
that cause monetary policy outcomes to deviate from the central bank’s intentions.
First, disclosure of the economic disturbances to which the central bank responds allows the
public to use the monetary policy actions to infer the central bank’s intentions. This leads to a
beneﬁcial information effect that reduces uncertainty about the central bank’s commitment to its
objectives and enhances the credibility of monetary policy. Furthermore, it has a positive incen-
tive effect because it makes monetary policy actions a more reliable signal of the central bank’s
13Indeterminacy problems ` a la Bernanke and Woodford (1997)should not be an issue provided the macroeconomic
forecasts conditional on market expectations of the policy rate are founded on a structural macroeconomic model.
17intentions. This makes private sector inﬂation expectations more sensitive to changes in the
policy instrument that cannot be explained by the anticipated shocks, which induces the central
bank to invest in reputation and reduce the inﬂation bias (Geraats 2005b). When the trans-
mission mechanism incorporates the adjustment of inﬂation expectations, transparency about
anticipated economic shocks could even completely eliminate the inﬂation bias (Geraats 2001).
Transparencyalsomakesprivatesectorexpectationslesssensitivetoanticipatedmonetarypolicy
actions, whichcouldgivethecentralbankgreaterﬂexibilitytorespondtoeconomicdisturbances
without affecting inﬂation expectations (Geraats 2000). These beneﬁcial effects of transparency
even apply when the central bank does not have superior economic information.
Second, changes to short run macroeconomic forecasts contain information about unantic-
ipated transmission disturbances. Transparency about such shocks gives rise to a beneﬁcial
incentive effect as it makes policy outcomes a better signal of the intentions of the central bank,
whichagainleadstoareputationeffectthatreducestheinﬂationbias(FaustandSvensson2001).
In addition to these beneﬁts, the publication of unconditional forecasts could have a positive
information effect and reduce private sector uncertainty about macroeconomic outcomes. How-
ever, transparency about economic information could also have harmful information effects.
When supply or transmission shocks are disclosed, the public could incorporate them into its in-
ﬂation expectations, which leads to greater inﬂation volatility and hampers output stabilization
(Cukierman 2001, Jensen 2002). Furthermore, there could be damaging incentive effects that
increase economic and ﬁnancial volatility when the public information is noisy and agents put
too much weight on it to coordinate their actions (Morris and Shin 2002).
Thesedetrimentaleffectsmayexplainwhysomecentralbanksarereluctanttobemoreforth-
coming about their forecasts. Nevertheless, there is econometric evidence that the publication of
forecasts is beneﬁcial. Using the Fry et al. (2000)survey data, Chortareas et al. (2002)show that
the publication of more detailed forecasts reduces average inﬂation in a sample of 82 countries,
even after controlling for macroeconomic characteristics such as GDP per capita, openness, po-
litical stability, exchange rate regime, and central bank independence. However, this does not
hold for countries with an exchange rate peg, which is consistent with the fact that the reputation
effectonlyappliesinthepresenceofdiscretionandcouldexplainthelowerforecasttransparency
among exchange rate targeters. In addition, the lower level of inﬂation due to greater forecast
transparency does not appear to come at the cost of greater output volatility.
To summarize, transparency about forward-looking analysis is widespread among central
banks, but the publication of frequent forecasts, quantitative projections, risks to forecasts and
forecast errors are each much less common. In addition, exchange rate targeters tend to exhibit
slightly less forecast transparency, whereas inﬂation targeters often display signiﬁcantly more.
4.3 Strategy and Decision-Making
The monetary policy strategy conceptually describes the procedure for monetary policymaking.
It explains how economic information is used to set the monetary policy instruments to reach the
monetary policy objectives. A signiﬁcant number of central banks publish their monetary policy
18strategy nowadays, which is largely due to the popularity of explicit inﬂation targeting. The
typical monetary policy strategy of inﬂation targeters amounts to setting the policy rate so that
the medium run (central bank) inﬂation forecast is consistent with the inﬂation target. Another
example is the self-branded ‘two-pillar strategy’ of the ECB, whereas the Federal Reserve and
the Bank of Japan do not publish their strategy. The chief advantage of an explicit monetary
policy strategy is that it reduces private sector uncertainty about the policymaking process and
makes monetary policy actions more predictable.
It is sometimes argued that monetary policy strategies differ in terms of transparency. In
particular, exchange rate targeting is considered very transparent whereas monetary targeting
tends to be regarded as more opaque. Much of this discussion is misguided since transparency
is not an inherent feature of the monetary policy strategy but the result of the central bank’s
communication policy. In principle, any monetary policy strategy could achieve transparency
with sufﬁcient communication efforts. However, the amount and type of information that needs
to be communicated to achieve transparency does depend on the monetary policy strategy. In
particular, with exchange rate targeting it is easy to understand monetary policy actions, but the
prediction of the inﬂation outcome requires additional information, namely forecasts of foreign
inﬂation and the change in the real exchange rate. In the case of monetary targeting, money
market shocks are important for policy settings and outcomes. Inﬂation targeting distinguishes
itself from other monetary policy strategies because of its information-inclusive approach that
imposes high demands on the ability of the central bank to effectively communicate all the
relevant information. Clearly, the communication policy needed to achieve transparency differs
across monetary policy strategies.
For most central banks, the monetary policy strategy does not provide a mechanical rule
for the setting of the policy instrument, with the exception of an exchange rate peg. When the
strategy leaves considerable discretion, transparency about decision-making also requires the
disclosure of details about how the monetary policy decision was taken, including minutes of
monetary policy meetings and voting records (if any). So, the lack of discretion under exchange
rate targeting helps to explain why the publication of minutes and voting records is so rare for
this monetary policy framework.
In most countries, monetary policy decisions are made by a committee of monetary poli-
cymakers. The minutes of their policy meetings give valuable insights into the arguments that
were raised and the considerations that drove the policy decision. It allows the public to ana-
lyze how monetary policymakers incorporate economic information to form their policy stance,
which leads to a better understanding of the implementation of the monetary policy strategy.
This could help to increase the predictability of monetary policy actions. In practice, only 18%
of countries release minutes of monetary policy meetings, although 60% of inﬂation targeters
do so (see Table 1). The publication of voting records is even less common, with fewer than
10% of central banks and 20% of inﬂation targeters. Major central banks that publish minutes
and voting records include the Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan and Bank of England, but not the
ECB.
However, in some countries monetary policy decisions are made solely by the central bank
19governor, which means that there are no minutes or voting records. Although the Fry et al.
(2000)data do not specify whether monetary policy decisions are made by the governor, out of
the 21 inﬂation targeters considered by Fracasso et al. (2003, Table 1.2), only 2 (Israel and New
Zealand) leave monetary policy decisions to the central bank governor instead of a committee. If
this prevalence of decision making by committee extends to other monetary policy frameworks,
Table 1 slightly understates the fraction of central banks that publish their minutes and release
their voting records.
When monetary policy actions are determined by a single central banker, transparency about
decision making requires detailed policy explanations instead of minutes. In either case, they
should contain an account of the main arguments that were considered during the decision pro-
cess. It is also important that they are published as soon after the monetary policy decision as
is practicably possible and at the latest before the subsequent policy decision. This allows the
private sector to gain a better understanding of the most recent monetary policy action, which
could help to predict subsequent policy decisions.
In practice, publication delays vary widely. Using the Fry et al. (2000, Appendix 1)survey
data, 12% of central banks publish minutes within a month of the monetary policy meeting.
The Federal Reserve recently decided to publish its minutes three weeks after the monetary
policy meeting instead of after the next meeting, which is still the practice of the Bank of Japan.
For inﬂation targeters, 7 (out of 19) central banks publish minutes, with a delay ranging from
about a week to several months, and 4 of them (Brazil, Czech Republic, Sweden and the United
Kingdom) release the minutes before the next monetary policy meeting (Schmidt-Hebbel and
Tapia 2002, Tables 15 and 20). This shows that timely information about policy discussions is
not very common.
The minutes that central banks publish tend to be non-verbatim and unattributed, although
there are a few exceptions. For instance, the minutes of the Swedish Riksbank feature an at-
tributed reservation by each member of the monetary policy committee that disagrees with the
policy decision. And the minutes of the Bank of Japan explicitly identify the remarks made by
government representatives attending the monetary policy meeting. The publication of verbatim
transcripts is extremely rare. An exception is the Federal Reserve, which has been forced to
release them but only with a ﬁve-year delay.
The disclosure of voting records is remarkably uncommon. Table 1 shows that only a third
of central banks that publish minutes also release voting records. The only countries in the Fry
et al. (2000)survey that publish voting patterns are Japan, Korea, Poland, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The voting records could be released as part of the minutes
of the monetary policy meeting (e.g. Japan and UK) or together with the announcement of the
monetary policy decision, a practice recently adopted by the Federal Reserve.
One issue with voting records is that some central banks (e.g. the ECB) state that the mone-
tary policycommittee decides ‘by consensus’.14 It is not exactly clear what this involvesbecause
consensus need not imply unanimity. Instead, it could mean that there were no strong objections
14Some other communication issues for such ‘collegial’ rather than ‘individualistic’ monetary policy committees
are discussed by Blinder and Wyplosz (2005).
20against the decision, or that a large majority of policymakers agreed with the decision. In any
case, decision making by consensus is opaque about the policy actions preferred by individual
central bankers. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the statutes of many central banks (including
the ECB) that stipulate that decisions be taken by a simple majority. Since consensus decisions
require more than a simply majority, they are likely to lead to much more sluggish decision
making.
In theory, the publication of minutes has a beneﬁcial information effect as it reduces private
sector uncertainty about the policy decision process. It is also likely to have a positive effect on
the central bank’s incentive to conduct high quality policy discussions. However, the publica-
tion of verbatim, attributed transcripts of monetary policy meetings could induce a detrimental
incentive effect because it is likely to make policymakers more guarded out of concern that their
words may be misinterpreted by ﬁnancial markets. In addition, it could make central bankers
with career concerns reluctant to offer dissenting opinions, which is supported by empirical ev-
idence (Meade and Stasavage 2004). So, live broadcasts or the release of verbatim transcripts
of monetary policy meetings are undesirable because they hamper an open policy discussion,
which reduces the efﬁciency of the decision process and the quality of monetary policy deci-
sions. But this problem does not arise for the unattributed minutes with a sanitized account of
the policy discussion that central banks tend to publish in practice.
Regardingthepublicationofattributedvotingrecords, thereisabeneﬁcialinformationeffect
since it allows the public to observe the monetary policy stance of individual central bankers
and thereby better predict future monetary policy actions. There is empirical evidence that
voting records are indeed informative about future policy decisions (Gerlach-Kristen 2004).
Another positive information effect is that voting transparency could identify central bankers
with socially desirable preferences so that they can be reappointed (Gersbach and Hahn 2004).
However, the publication of individual voting records also has incentive effects. In par-
ticular, ‘doves’ in the monetary policy committee that vote for inﬂationary actions would be
exposed, which could induce them to build reputation by voting as an anti-inﬂationary ‘hawk’
(Sibert 2003). On the other hand, voting transparency could affect monetary policy votes in a
negative way. Monetary policymakers could be tempted to vote according to the wishes of the
government that reappoints them, which is detrimental when the government favors inﬂationary
policy. Similarly, voting opacity could be desirable for a monetary union in which central bank
reappointments are made by national governments, as is the case for the ECB (Gersbach and
Hahn 2005).
This suggests that the desirability of voting transparency may depend on the (re)appointment
process for central bankers. The beneﬁcial reputation effect is likely to be stronger when central
bankers have a longer term of ofﬁce, whereas the detrimental incentive effects hinge on renew-
able terms for central bankers. So, when central bankers have a long term of ofﬁce without the
possibility of reappointment, voting transparency is likely beneﬁcial as it reduces private sector
uncertainty about the policy stance. On the other hand, central bankers that are subject to reap-
pointment could embrace voting secrecy to protect themselves from political pressures. Perhaps,
this helps to explain why the release of voting records is so rare in practice.
21Table 4: Policy transparency across and within monetary policy frameworks.
Relative frequency Full sample Targeting Other Homogeneity
Exch. rate Money Inﬂation rejecteda
Publication of explanation
Policy changes 0.809 0.808 0.696 0.933 0.833 **
All policy decisionsb 0.154 0.042 0.261 0.267 0.103 **
Observations 94 (91b) 26 (24b) 23 15 30 (29b)
Source: Author’s calculations using Fry et al. (2000) survey data.
Note: Numbers in bold are over 10 percent point different from the full sample relative frequency.
(a) Â2
1 test of homogeneity between monetary policy frameworks rejected at a (**) 5% signiﬁcance level.
(b) Missing observations for Denmark, EMU and Singapore.
4.4 Policy Stance
The monetary policy stance is the outcome of the decision-making process. It consists of a
monetary policy action that sets the level of the policy instrument and a policy inclination that
describes how policymakers are inclined to move beyond the current policy action.
Many central banks make their monetary policy decisions at regular meetings according
to an announced schedule. Knowing the dates of policy meetings in advance reduces private
sector uncertainty and is likely to lead to greater stability as ﬁnancial markets only have to brace
themselves for monetary policy actions on a limited number of days.
Monetary policy decisions specify the settings of operating instruments or targets. Many
central banks use a short run nominal interest rate such as the overnight interbank rate or a
repo rate as their policy rate.15 But in developing countries the use of a monetary aggregate
is more common because the presence of an underdeveloped ﬁnancial system complicates the
use of market-based implementation of a policy rate. The decision to adjust the setting of the
operating instrument or target is promptly announced by over 80% of central banks (see Table
4). Transparency about policy changes is nowadays almost taken for granted, but this has not
always been the case. For instance, the Federal Reserve only adopted this practice in 1994
instead of keeping changes in the federal funds rate target secret until the next policy meeting.
Typically, central banks adjust their operating instrument or target in discrete steps. In par-
ticular, the minimum step for policy rates tends to be 25 basis points. As a consequence, central
banks regularly decide at the monetary policy meeting not to adjust the policy instrument or tar-
get. However, few central banks provide an explanation of the monetary policy decision when
the policy settings are not adjusted. Table 4 shows that only 15% of central banks publish an
explanation for all policy decisions, even when there is no change in policy settings. For ex-
ample, the Bank of England and Bank of Japan only tend to provide an immediate explanation
in case of policy changes. But transparency requires that all monetary policy decisions are ex-
15Chile is an exception as it controls the real interbank rate. In addition, Mexico is the only inﬂation targeting
country to use a monetary aggregate, the ‘corto’ (short position), as its policy instrument.
22plained because it helps the private sector to better understand how the central banks determines
its policy settings. After all, new economic information has arrived since the previous policy
meetings, so no change in policy settings could be just as important and informative as a policy
adjustment.
There is some variation across monetary policy frameworks in the degree of transparency
about policy decisions, as is shown in Table 4. In particular, exchange rate targeters mostly con-
ﬁne themselves to explaining policy changes and are less likely than others to explain decisions
involving no policy change. In contrast, money and inﬂation targeters have a relative frequency
of explanations for all policy decisions that is high above the average for the full sample. The
difference between exchange rate targeters and the aggregate of monetary and inﬂation targeters
is statistically signiﬁcant. Probably, the limited discretion under ﬁxed exchange rates reduces
the need for explaining no–policy-change decisions.
However, transparency of the monetary policy stance requires more than publishing expla-
nations of all policy actions. Since policy rates tend to be adjusted in discrete steps, they do not
provide a precise indicator of the policy stance. For instance, if the desired policy rate equals
3.1%, the policy setting is typically rounded to 3%. So, there is an important role for a policy
‘tilt’, ‘bias’ or ‘inclination’ that conveys some of this information about the policy stance.
An even more elaborate indicator of the policy stance is the time path of the policy rate that
is considered optimal by the central bank. This is not only useful for the prediction of future
interest rates but it is also critical for ﬁguring out the likely macroeconomic effects of monetary
policy. In particular, a change in the policy rate that is anticipated to be persistent has a bigger
impact on long term interest rates and is therefore more effective in affecting macroeconomic
outcomes than an adjustment of the policy rate that only lasts, say, one quarter. So, the projected
time path of the policy rate is a crucial component of the monetary policy stance.
In practice, the publication of a policy inclination or projection is not common. Using the
Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2004)data for nine major central banks, two provide a policy inclination
(the Federal Reserve and Swedish Riksbank) and only one (the Reserve Bank of New Zealand)
publishes policy rate projections.
The disclosure of a policy inclination allows the private sector to observe the current policy
stance more accurately. This has a beneﬁcial information effect as it facilitates the understanding
of monetary policymaking and increases the predictability of future policy actions.
However, the publication of an optimal policy rate path could also give rise to a detrimental
incentive effect when ﬁnancial market participants decide to ignore their private signals and co-
ordinate their actions on the published policy path (cf Morris and Shin 2002). The reason is that
the central bank’s policy projection could be quite noisy compared to private sector information
because the optimal path for the policy rate depends on the market reactions to policy settings,
about which ﬁnancial market participants are likely to have better information than the central
bank. So, excessive focus on the central bank’s policy projection could lead to greater volatility
in ﬁnancial markets.
Another issue is the challenge to communicate effectively that the projected policy path
or inclination does not constitute a commitment to speciﬁc future policy decisions. Instead,
23it is a projection that is conditional on the information currently available and it is bound to
adjust in response to new economic information. Perhaps, these complications explain why the
publication of policy inclinations or projections is so rare.
It is sometimes argued that voting patterns or risks to the central bank’s forecasts provide
an indication of the policy inclination. However, neither is a perfect substitute. For instance,
suppose that all central bankers agree that the desired policy rate is 3.1% and therefore decide
to leave the policy rate at 3%. Then the voting records would not reveal the positive policy
inclination. In fact, voting patterns would only correctly reveal the policy tilt if the distribution
of desired policy rates across policymakers is sufﬁciently wide and symmetric. Regarding risks
to forecasts, suppose there is an upward risk to the inﬂation forecast and a downward risk to the
output forecast. Then it is not straightforward to infer the policy inclination. These examples
illustrate that the publication of the policy inclination is not redundant when voting patterns and
risks to forecasts are released.
5 Additional Considerations
There are two additional considerations that are important for understanding the practice of
monetary policy transparency. First, central banks may be forced to disclose information to meet
formal accountability requirements. Second, a central bank may not be able to be as transparent
as it intends because of challenges associated with the effective communication of information.
5.1 Accountability
In general, accountability requires transparency about at least the institutional setting and the
formal objectives, so that it is clear who should be held responsible and for what. As discussed in
section 4.1, many central banks enjoy a considerable degree of independence and nearly all have
explicit targets nowadays. Although instrument independence is common, goal independence is
more unusual since the government has a role in setting the target for 71% of central banks (Fry
et al. 2000, Table 4.5). This reduces the democratic deﬁcit that arises from the delegation of the
conduct of monetary policy to an independent central bank. Another way to ensure democratic
legitimacy is to shift the ﬁnal responsibility for monetary policy to government by allowing it
to overrule monetary policy decisions through a formal override mechanism. In theory, this
impinges on the independence of the central bank, which is likely to lead to higher inﬂation, but
itincreasestheﬂexibilitytorespondtoshocks(Lohmann1992). Anexplicitoverridemechanism
exists in 21% of countries (Fry et al. 2000, Table 4.5), including the United Kingdom and New
Zealand, although in practice it is rarely invoked.
Accountability of monetary policy typically requires additional transparency besides insti-
tutional arrangements and explicit objectives. One reason is that monetary policy decisions are
often made by a committee. If the monetary policymakers face individual rather than collective
responsibility, the publication of individual voting records is also pertinent to accountability.
But in practice, very few central banks release voting records, as discussed in section 4.3.
24Furthermore, depending on the monetary policy framework, it may not be possible to control
the targeted variable perfectly and without delay. In particular, the performance of an exchange
rate targeter is easy to monitor because the exchange rate can be directly controlled as long as
foreign reserves are sufﬁcient. But, the evaluation of a central bank engaged in monetary target-
ing is more complicated because the central bank typically does not have perfect control over the
targeted monetary aggregates. So, monetary control errors due to unanticipated developments
in money markets need to be taken into account.
The assessment of an inﬂation targeter is even more challenging. Monetary policymakers
cannot perfectly control inﬂation due to unpredictable transmission disturbances, such as oil
shocks and terror attacks. In addition, there is a long transmission lag of one to two years from
the change in the monetary policy instrument to its effect on inﬂation. So, current inﬂation out-
comes reﬂect past policy decisions and cannot be used to assess the appropriateness of the cur-
rentpolicystance. Toachieveaccountability inreal timeit isnecessary toevaluatewhethermon-
etary policy actions are likely to achieve the inﬂation target. As a result, transparency about the
central bank’s inﬂation forecasts is a key ingredient for effective accountability under inﬂation
targeting. But the inﬂation forecast is not a sufﬁcient statistic; comprehensive macroeconomic
information is needed because of the information-inclusive approach of inﬂation targeters.
Clearly, accountability requires greater transparency under inﬂation targeting than under ex-
change rate targeting. This could be another reason why inﬂation targeters tend to be more
transparent than exchange rate targeters, as shown in Table 1. However, the formal disclosure
requirements that central banks are subject to tend to be insufﬁcient to adequately assess the ap-
propriateness of monetary policy actions. Moreover, the public communications of most central
banks by far exceed their legal requirements, which suggests that formal accountability is not
the main motivation for transparency.
In practice, monetary policy accountability mostly takes the form of parliamentary monitor-
ing, which typically involves regular testimonies by central bankers. The central bank is subject
to monitoring by the legislature in 74% of countries (Fry et al. 2000, Table 4.5). In addition, 18%
of central banks face formal procedures when the target is missed. For instance, the central bank
could be required to provide a written explanation for the deviation from the target. In a few
cases, the sanctions could be more draconian. For example, the governor of the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand could be ﬁred if the inﬂation target is missed. A more proactive approach to
accountability is to assess the reliability of the monetary policymaking process through an eval-
uation of the monetary policy framework by external experts as has been done in New Zealand,
Norway and the United Kingdom.
These accountability provisions are likely to provide a direct incentive to improve monetary
policymaking. In addition, accountability could be important to maintain public support for
central bank independence. This suggests that accountability has intrinsic beneﬁts.
Although accountability could directly affect transparency through formal disclosure re-
quirements and public testimonies, the increase in monetary policy transparency over time (de-
scribed by stylized fact II) has typically not been the result of modiﬁcations to central bank ac-
countability. But accountability could induce improvements in central bank transparency with-
25out formal disclosure requirements. For instance, (nonbinding) European Parliament resolutions
on the ECB Annual Report have repeatedly urged the ECB to be become more transparent, and
the publication of the ECB’s macroeconomic projections appears to have been triggered by the
quarterly ‘monetary dialogue’ between the ECB and the European Parliament Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs (based on Article 113(3) of the Treaty on European Union).
Nevertheless, central banks would probably be prepared to withstand such outside pressures if
the greater openness were considered to be damaging. In fact, the Federal Reserve vigorously
countered some legal challenges to its secrecy (Merrill vs Federal Open Market Committee,
which is discussed by Goodfriend 1986).
These considerations suggest that accountability is unlikely to be the main driving force
behind central bank transparency.
5.2 Communication Challenges
While accountability requirements could force a central bank to disclose information and be
transparent against its will, central banks could also be involuntarily opaque. Although such a
situation might occur due to conﬁdentiality requirements faced by central banks, in practice it is
much more likely to arise because of challenges in the effective communication of information.
One of the main reasons why there exists a big gap between the theory and practice of
transparency is that the theoretical literature tends to abstract from the complications that arise
when central banks attempt to reduce information asymmetries through communications. Most
transparency models simply assume that information somehow gets perfectly conveyed. In fact,
some models do not even have explicit announcements. However, in practice it is not trivial to
communicate information effectively and there is a lot of scope for misinterpretation.
From a practical perspective, transparency is better understood in terms of openness, clarity
and common understanding (Winkler 2002). Transparency does not merely amount to complete
openness in the sense of disclosing all information. The reason is that agents are constrained
by limited resources, so ﬂooding them with data may not help them to extract the relevant
information. To obtain symmetric information it is important to communicate with clarity and
reach common understanding about the monetary policy process.
There is inevitably some friction between openness and clarity. For instance, an elaborate
description of the policy stance may be more accurate, but a stylized summary is likely to pro-
vide greater clarity. This also explains why some central banks resort to the use of standard
phrases. When the meaning of such phrases is commonly understood, it greatly facilitates effec-
tive communication.
This also underscores the importance of an active communication policy. To achieve trans-
parency, the central bank should carefully identify what information is most useful for under-
standing monetary policymaking, and how to communicate it effectively. A framework of reg-
ular publications (e.g. policy statements, inﬂation reports, minutes) provides an institutional
commitment to the communication strategy. Since such publications are known to receive cen-
tral attention, they also foster common knowledge about monetary policy.
26Central bank communications are a critical tool in addition to monetary policy instruments.
The latter directly affect short term (nominal) interest rates, whereas the former have the po-
tential to inﬂuence private sector expectations about future policy rates and inﬂation. These
expectations determine the long term and real interest rates that matter most for economic deci-
sions.
Although central bank communications could greatly facilitate the conduct of monetary pol-
icy, there is also scope for misinterpretations and overreactions that could roil ﬁnancial markets.
To reduce the likelihood of overreactions, central bankers may decide to avoid straight talk and
use ‘constructive ambiguity’ instead. In fact, creating the perception of opacity could even be
the optimal way to communicate information (Geraats 2005a).
There could be other reasons for vague communications. When announcements are costless
or‘cheaptalk’, a centralbankcanonly crediblyconveyitsprivateinformationthroughimprecise
announcements (Stein 1989). In practice, however, central bank communications are a valuable
tool in the conduct of monetary policy that is open to public scrutiny, and with the central bank’s
reputation at stake, it is far from cheap.
Furthermore, sometimes it can be very difﬁcult to be precise. The communication of uncer-
tainty is particularly challenging because of the innumerable sources of incomplete information.
Nevertheless, it is important for the central bank to convey uncertainty, especially when it affects
monetary policy decisions. Otherwise, the central bank’s inaction due to uncertainty could lead
to doubts about its intentions. Although it is impossible to specify all uncertainties the central
bank faces, the most relevant ones could be usefully communicated through ‘scenarios’ that de-
scribe speciﬁc risks and ‘conﬁdence intervals’ around numeric projections that illustrate more
generally the (possibly skewed) balance of risks.
The precise communication needs of a central bank are determined by its monetary pol-
icy strategy. Empirically, the type of information disclosed by central banks is systematically
related to the monetary policy framework, as shown in section 4. Although some communica-
tion policies may be better than others, in practice different communication strategies could be
equally effective in terms of ﬁnancial market responses and the predictability of monetary policy
actions (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005). This suggests that there is more than one way in which
communication challenges could be successfully overcome.
6 Conclusions
Transparency has gradually become a prominent characteristic of monetary policy throughout
the world. This paper systematically explores transparency practices and reconciles them with
theoretical insights. The theory is distilled into two effects that drive the economic consequences
of transparency, namely ex post ‘information effects’ that directly result from the conferral of in-
formation, and ex ante ‘incentive effects’ that are caused by systematic changes in economic be-
havior under the different information structure. Three key theoretical results are that monetary
policy transparency (A) improves the predictability of monetary policy actions and outcomes,
(B) induces reputation building as it increases the sensitivity of private sector expectations to
27unanticipated policy actions and outcomes, and (C) enhances credibility and makes long-run
private sector inﬂation expectations more stable.
The main contribution of this paper has been to present three stylized facts on the practice of
monetary policy transparency. In particular, the paper has established that (I) central banks con-
sider transparency very important for monetary policy, (II) transparency of monetary policy has
increased remarkably during the last 15 years, and (III) monetary policy transparency displays
substantial heterogeneity both across and within monetary policy frameworks.
Regarding the heterogeneity in transparency of monetary policy, most countries are rea-
sonably transparent about central bank independence, monetary policy targets, forward-looking
analysis and explanations of policy changes. At the same time, they tend to be very opaque
about minutes, voting records and explanations of no-policy-change decisions.
Furthermore, there are also three signiﬁcant differences in transparency across monetary
policy frameworks. First, central banks that do not engage in exchange rate, money or in-
ﬂation targeting are less likely to publish an explicit target, which reﬂects the central role of
announced targets for targeting regimes. Second, inﬂation and money targeters are more likely
to be transparent about forecasts than exchange rate targeters and others without an explicit tar-
geting framework. Third, inﬂation targeters are more likely to display greater openness with
respect to forecasts, minutes and voting records. This may be explained by the forward-looking,
information-inclusive approach to monetary policymaking that characterizes inﬂation targeting.
Although transparency tends to be more common for inﬂation targeters, the adoption of in-
ﬂation targeting does not guarantee transparency in all respects. In addition, there is remarkable
variation in the degree of central bank transparency under inﬂation targeting as well as under
other monetary policy frameworks.
Transparency practices do not seem to be primarily driven by accountability requirements.
Instead, central banks appear to have embraced transparency for its perceived economic beneﬁts.
In particular, empirical evidence shows that monetary policy transparency could lead to greater
predictability of policy actions, reduce average inﬂation and lower the sacriﬁce ratio. However,
many communication challenges remain and central banks are likely to continue their efforts to
pursue greater transparency of monetary policy in practice.
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